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Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

ID: 89Date: (C)2012-05-14   (M)2017-10-19
Type: weaknessStatus: DRAFT
Abstraction Type: Base


The software constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component.

Extended Description

Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands.

SQL injection has become a common issue with database-driven web sites. The flaw is easily detected, and easily exploited, and as such, any site or software package with even a minimal user base is likely to be subject to an attempted attack of this kind. This flaw depends on the fact that SQL makes no real distinction between the control and data planes.

Enabling Factors for Exploitation
The application dynamically generates queries that contain user input.

Likelihood of Exploit: Very High

Applicable Platforms
Language Class: All
Technology Class: Database-Server

Time Of Introduction

  • Architecture and Design
  • Implementation
  • Operation

Related Attack Patterns

Common Consequences

ScopeTechnical ImpactNotes
Read application data
Since SQL databases generally hold sensitive data, loss of confidentiality is a frequent problem with SQL injection vulnerabilities.
Bypass protection mechanism
If poor SQL commands are used to check user names and passwords, it may be possible to connect to a system as another user with no previous knowledge of the password.
Bypass protection mechanism
If authorization information is held in a SQL database, it may be possible to change this information through the successful exploitation of a SQL injection vulnerability.
Modify application data
Just as it may be possible to read sensitive information, it is also possible to make changes or even delete this information with a SQL injection attack.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.
Automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or do not require any code changes.
Automated static analysis might not be able to detect the usage of custom API functions or third-party libraries that indirectly invoke SQL commands, leading to false negatives - especially if the API/library code is not available for analysis.
Automated Dynamic Analysis
This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
Manual Analysis
Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.

Potential Mitigations

Architecture and Design
Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Architecture and Design
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [R.89.3]
Architecture and Design
Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [R.89.12]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Architecture and Design
 For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict whitelist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs (i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). A blacklist is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent whitelists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Architecture and Design
Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
 Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience, and nobody else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic and not being cryptic enough. They should not necessarily reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Such detailed information can be used to refine the original attack to increase the chances of success.
If errors must be tracked in some detail, capture them in log messages - but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Avoid recording highly sensitive information such as passwords in any form. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a username is valid or not.
In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.
An application firewall might not cover all possible input vectors. In addition, attack techniques might be available to bypass the protection mechanism, such as using malformed inputs that can still be processed by the component that receives those inputs. Depending on functionality, an application firewall might inadvertently reject or modify legitimate requests. Finally, some manual effort may be required for customization.
Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

SQL injection can be resultant from special character mismanagement, MAID, or blacklist/whitelist problems. It can be primary to authentication errors.

Related CWETypeViewChain
CWE-89 ChildOf CWE-896 Category CWE-888  

Demonstrative Examples   (Details)

  1. In 2008, a large number of web servers were compromised using the same SQL injection attack string. This single string worked against many different programs. The SQL injection was then used to modify the web sites to serve malicious code. [1]
  2. MS SQL has a built in function that enables shell command execution. An SQL injection in such a context could be disastrous. For example, a query of the form:
  3. The following code dynamically constructs and executes a SQL query that searches for items matching a specified name. The query restricts the items displayed to those where owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
  4. This code intends to print a message summary given the message ID.
  5. This example attempts to take a last name provided by a user and enter it into a database.
  6. This example examines the effects of a different malicious value passed to the query constructed and executed in the previous example.

Observed Examples

  1. CVE-2004-0366 : chain: SQL injection in library intended for database authentication allows SQL injection and authentication bypass.
  2. CVE-2008-2790 : SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
  3. CVE-2008-2223 : SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
  4. CVE-2007-6602 : SQL injection via user name.
  5. CVE-2008-5817 : SQL injection via user name or password fields.
  6. CVE-2003-0377 : SQL injection in security product, using a crafted group name.
  7. CVE-2008-2380 : SQL injection in authentication library.

For more examples, refer to CVE relations in the bottom box.

White Box Definitions
A weakness where the code path has:
1. start statement that accepts input and
2. end statement that performs an SQL command where
a. the input is part of the SQL command and
b. input contains SQL syntax (esp. query separator)

Black Box Definitions

Taxynomy Mappings

PLOVER  SQL injection
7 Pernicious Kingdoms  SQL Injection
CLASP  SQL injection
OWASP Top Ten 2007 A2
Injection Flaws
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A1
Unvalidated Input
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A6
Injection Flaws
SQL Injection


  1. Michael Howard David LeBlanc John Viega .24 Deadly Sins of Software Security. McGraw-Hill. Section:'"Sin 1: SQL Injection." Page 3'. Published on 2010.
  2. M. Howard D. LeBlanc .Writing Secure Code 2nd Edition. Microsoft. Section:'Chapter 12, "Database Input Issues" Page 397'. Published on 2002.
  3. OWASP .SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet.
  4. Steven Friedl .SQL Injection Attacks by Example. 2007-10-10.
  5. Ferruh Mavituna .SQL Injection Cheat Sheet. 2007-03-15.
  6. David Litchfield Chris Anley John Heasman Bill Grindlay .The Database Hacker's Handbook: Defending Database Servers. Wiley. 2005-07-14.
  7. David Litchfield .The Oracle Hacker's Handbook: Hacking and Defending Oracle. Wiley. 2007-01-30.
  8. Microsoft .SQL Injection. Published on December 2008.
  9. Microsoft Security Vulnerability Research & Defense .SQL Injection Attack.
  10. Michael Howard .Giving SQL Injection the Respect it Deserves. 2008-05-15.
  11. Frank Kim .Top 25 Series - Rank 2 - SQL Injection. SANS Software Security Institute. 2010-03-01.
  12. Sean Barnum Michael Gegick .Least Privilege. Published on 2005-09-14.
  13. Mark Dowd John McDonald Justin Schuh .The Art of Software Security Assessment 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. Section:'Chapter 8, "SQL Queries", Page 431.'. Published on 2006.
  14. Mark Dowd John McDonald Justin Schuh .The Art of Software Security Assessment 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. Section:'Chapter 17, "SQL Injection", Page 1061.'. Published on 2006.
CVE    3447

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